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TURNING THE WORLD UPSIDE DOWN: HOW FRAMES OF 
REFERENCE SHAPE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
BY 
JAMES SALZMAN AND MARTIN DOYLE* 
Models and representations help us understand complex 
phenomena. The Mercator map presents a familiar, two-dimensional 
view of our three-dimensional world, for example, but it can distort as 
much as it clarifies. In the natural sciences, too, there are very different 
ways of framing reality. The classic method developed by Leonard 
Euler measures a system from a fixed point. A competing method 
developed by Joseph Louis Lagrange measures from the perspective of 
a particle moving within the system. These Eulerian and Lagrangian 
methods of measurement dominate the physical sciences and provide 
different, though equally valid, measures of how the system operates. 
This Article explores how our frame of reference shapes our 
understanding and application of environmental law. Using examples 
from the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and other statutes, we argue 
that environmental law is just as sensitive to Eulerian and Lagrangian 
frames of reference as fluid mechanics or cartography, and that this 
sensitivity predetermines how we conceive of environmental problems 
and solutions far more than we realize. Understanding the implicit but 
fundamental importance of frames of reference can help explain 
emerging challenges such as water pollution from fracking, air 
pollution hot spots, and epigenetic sensitivities to pollution. 
 
 *   Samuel Fox Mordecai Professor of Law, Duke Law School, Nicholas Institute Professor 
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TOJCI.SALZMAN 3/11/2014  3:00 PM 




I.   INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 2 
II.    REFERENCE FRAMES IN FLUID DYNAMICS ..................................................................... 9 
III.    REFERENCE FRAMES IN THE LAW ................................................................................ 15 
IV.    WHAT DO REFERENCE FRAMES MEAN FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW? .......................... 22 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1569, the Flemish geographer, Geradus Mercator, published a new 
type of map. His innovation placed the Equator as its standard parallel, 
making lines of latitude and longitude intersect at right angles to one 
another.1 Previous cartographers had realized that the Earth was round and 
placed continents as best they could but, as the Mappa Mundi of 1449 shown 







 1  JOHN P. SNYDER, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MAP PROJECTIONS—A WORKING MANUAL 38–39 
(1987), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/1395/report.pdf. 
 2  Wikimedia, Walsperger - Mappa Mundi, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: 
Walsperger_-_Mappa_mundi.jpg (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
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The Mercator Projection was particularly well-suited to its time because 
it allowed navigators to determine lines of constant true direction—the 
compass direction on the map connecting two points was the same compass 
direction that a ship would follow at sea.3 At a time of maritime empires, far-
flung voyages, and exploration, this map was just what captains needed to 
cross an ocean. Mercator’s vision has endured and remains the standard 
map on classroom walls around the world, the conventional and accurate 




At least that’s the story, but it’s not really true. 
 
While maintaining accurate geographic direction between lines of 
latitude and longitude, the Mercator Projection map quickly starts to distort 
areas and shapes once one moves north or south from the Equator.5 
Consider, for example, the exchange on the popular TV show The West Wing 
White House staffers C.J. Cregg and Josh Lyman with Professor Sayles and 
his well-intentioned colleagues in the Organization of Cartographers for 
Social Equality, who want the White House to replace the Mercator 
Projection map in classrooms with the more accurate Peters Projection map: 
SAYLES: [Showing the Mercator Projection map on the screen] Here we have 
Europe drawn considerably larger than South America when at 6.9 million 
square miles South America is almost double the size of Europe’s 3.8 million. 
HUKE: Alaska appears three times as large as Mexico, when Mexico is larger 
by .1 million square miles. 
 
 3  See SNYDER, supra note 1, at 39 (“The major navigational feature of the projection is 
found in the fact that a sailing route between two points is shown as a straight line, if the 
direction or azimuth of the ship remains constant with respect to north.”). 
 4  Wikimedia, World in Equidistant Cylindrical Projection with Grids, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:World_in_equidistant_cylindrical_projection_with_grid
s.png (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
 5  See Nick Stockton, Get to Know a Projection: Mercator, WIRED, July 29, 2013, 
http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2013/07/projection-mercator/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).  
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SAYLES: Germany appears in the middle of the map when it’s in the 
northernmost quarter of the Earth. 
JOSH: Wait, wait. Relative size is one thing, but you’re telling me that Germany 
isn’t where we think it is? 
FALLOW: Nothing’s where you think it is. 
C.J.: Where is it? 
* * * 
FALLOW: When Third World countries are misrepresented they’re likely to be 
valued less. When Mercator maps exaggerate the importance of Western 
civilization, when the top of the map is given to the northern hemisphere and 
the bottom is given to the southern . . . then people will tend to adopt top and 
bottom attitudes. 
C.J.: But . . . wait. How. . . Where else could you put the Northern Hemisphere 
but on the top? 
SAYLES: On the bottom. 
C.J.: How? 
FALLOW: Like this. 
[The map is flipped over.] 
C.J.: Yeah, but you can’t do that. 
FALLOW: Why not? 
C.J.: ‘Cause it’s freaking me out.6 
7 
 
 6  The West Wing: Somebody’s Going To Emergency, Somebody’s Going To Jail (Warner 
Bros. broadcast Feb. 28, 2001). 
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 C.J. is understandably upset when her world is turned upside down, but 
there is no obvious reason why the map should have north on top or, for that 
matter, be centered along the Equator. Indeed, the first question posed by 
professors in introductory geography courses often is the simple yet 
disarming, “Why is north up?”8 The Mappa Mundi shown on the first page of 
this Article, for example, had south on top. Or imagine a map with the North 
Pole at the middle, projected outward from the Arctic.9 This projection is 
disorienting. Finding Alaska takes some time. 
 
In the past, this projection was largely irrelevant or a simple curiosity. 
The melting of the ice cap along with the continued discovery of natural 
resources at the North Pole, however, has made this projection increasingly 
relevant for understanding rapidly evolving geopolitics. More broadly, 
conceptualizing the world as centered on Western Europe and the Atlantic 
(as the typical projection implies) may be less relevant as the global 
economy pivots toward South Asia,10 or, potentially, as there is greater global 
commerce across the North Pole than across the North Atlantic.11 
 
 7  Wikimedia, World Upside Down, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:World_upside 
_down.jpg (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
 8  See generally Jeremy W. Crampton & John Krygier, An Introduction to Critical 
Cartography, 4 ACME: AN INT’L E-JOURNAL FOR CRITICAL GEOGRAPHIES 11, 12–13 (2005), available 
at http://www.acme-journal.org/vol4/JWCJK.pdf (providing an overview of the field of critical 
cartography). 
 9  Wikimedia, Blankmap-ao-090N-North Pole, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: 
Blankmap-ao-090N-north_pole.png (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).  
 10  See LAURENCE C. SMITH, THE WORLD IN 2050: FOUR FORCES SHAPING CIVILIZATION’S 
NORTHERN FUTURE 41 (2010); Daniel Tencer, World’s Economic Centre of Gravity Shifting Back 
to Asia at Unbelievable Speed: McKinsey Institute, HUFFINGTON POST CANADA, July 5, 2012, 
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Most often we use maps to represent the physical size of geographic 
space scaled to some projection, but a map need not just be a spatial 
projection of geographic relations. A map is a model––a representation of 
the spatial distribution of natural, political, economic, or any other type of 
information or data. The size of a projected area on a map may be scaled by 
income or by race rather than actual geographic area.12 Within the United 
States, voting maps for political elections scaled by population indicate far 




Maps powerfully provide a great deal of data in an accessible manner; 
but they cannot reflect reality. At its most obvious, geographic maps do not 
fully reflect the world because something is inevitably lost when projecting a 
three-dimensional object on a two-dimensional surface. More subtly, map 
projections inherently depend on a sequence of often unarticulated, or even 
unrecognized, assumptions. The geographic map not only loses some 
physical accuracy depending on the projection system, but also smuggles in 
 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2012/07/05/world-economic-center-of-gravity_n_1651730.html 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2014)  
 11  See SMITH, supra note 10, at 156–57. 
 12  Twisted Sifter, 40 Maps That Will Help You Make Sense of the World, 
http://twistedsifter.com/2013/08/maps-that-will-help-you-make-sense-of-the-world/ (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2014) (showing various types of maps; with over 939,000 Facebook “likes” and 23,400 
tweets, this site has gone viral). 
 13  Wikimedia, Cartogram–2012 Electoral Vote, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: 
Cartogram%E2%80%942012_Electoral_Vote.svg (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
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a series of normative assumptions that are much less obvious––hence 
Professor Fallow’s concerns about the primacy of Northern Hemisphere 
countries over the Global South.14 Maps both clarify and distort. 
Despite their limitations, maps also create opportunities. The way they 
frame the world allows questions to be asked that might otherwise be 
ignored or unseen. Looking at the Mercator map, for example, tells us 
virtually nothing about the North Pole. A polar projection, by contrast, 
immediately brings into stark relief the complicated jurisdictional conflicts 
among the northern countries.15 These conflicts are invisible on a Mercator 
projection, where the North Pole is distorted out of all recognition. 
These same challenges and opportunities are also present in the natural 
sciences. There, in addition to space, scientists must combine temporal and 
spatial information to develop an understanding of the biophysical dynamics 
that shape the distribution of natural resources, organisms, communities, 
and chemicals. In these cases, the projection or presentation of temporal 
and spatial information forms the basis for not just presenting information, 
but also how that information might be abstracted into relations that form 
the basis of analytical reductions, from simple correlations and analytical 
equations to complex computational models. 
How objects move through space and time has been fundamental to the 
intellectual development and scientific theory of physical processes. Two 
eighteenth century mathematicians—Leonard Euler and Joseph Louis 
Lagrange—made seminal contributions to how movement is conceived in 
the natural sciences, specifically in the field of fluid mechanics.16 They are 
not popular names today, but their different ways of framing the world still 
dominate how scientists conceptualize and measure physical phenomena. 
Central to both of these mathematicians’ early work was 
conceptualizing the seemingly simple problem of water flow and the velocity 
of water “parcels.” Euler developed a theory of fluid mechanics that began 
with a clearly defined system of Cartesian coordinates—a mathematical 
description of the space of interest.17 This theory allowed him to develop a 
powerful system of equations that could describe the distribution of force 
and velocity within a particular region of fluid. 
In contrast, Lagrange’s formulation of mechanics was not tied to any 
one coordinate system—rather, any convenient independent variable could 
 
 14  The West Wing, supra note 6.  
 15  See Steve Connor, Arctic Ice-Melt Will Bring Frosty Relations as Nations Navigate Across 
North Pole, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 4, 2013, www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-
change/arctic-icemelt-will-bring-frosty-relations-as-nations-navigate-across-north-pole-
8519915.html (discussing tension between northern countries caused by global warming). 
 16  J.S. Calero, The Genesis of Fluid Mechanics, 1640–1780, 22 STUDIES IN HIST. & 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCI. 401 (2008). 
 17  See JAMES F. PRICE, LAGRANGIAN AND EULERIAN REPRESENTATIONS OF FLUID FLOW: 
KINEMATICS AND THE EQUATIONS OF MOTION 1 (2006), available at http://www.whoi.edu/ 
science/PO/people/jprice/class/ELreps.pdf (discussing the distinction between the theories of 
Euler and Lagrange). 
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be used to describe the system (e.g., distance along a river channel).18 
Lagrange focused on specific actors within the larger system and analyzed 
how those specific actors (e.g., parcels of water) behaved wherever they 
might be. He then calculated the characteristics of the fluid that caused the 
particular movements of the object of interest.19 
In simple terms, Euler’s approach framed the system as a black box 
with inputs and outputs: a flux. The fluid moved in and out of that region 
and, by studying the characteristics of the collection of fluid parcels at the 
entry and exit, one could quantify the forces exerted within that region that 
might cause the changes observed at the boundaries. Lagrange’s reference 
frame looked inside the box, tracing specific actors within the system: a 
flow. While the Eulerian and Lagrangian reference frames were derived from 
mathematics and physics for fluid mechanics, they have been adopted by 
natural scientists as the basic reference frames for the analysis of the 
movement of objects within the environment. 20 
A simple example of these different frames of reference can be seen in 
monitoring traffic. The standard approach is to use road-cams above 
bridges. This is an Eulerian approach, measuring flux from a fixed position. 
The new smart phone application, Waze, by contrast, allows each Waze user 
to transmit his or her location or speed on the road at that moment.21 This is 
a Lagrangian framing, following individual actors rather than measuring a 
flux at a fixed point. Both frames provide an accurate view of traffic, but 
from very different perspectives. 
The debates surrounding the Mercator Projection or the Eulerian and 
Lagrangian approaches take place in very different fields, but they are asking 
the same basic question: What is the most effective reference frame for 
conceptualizing, understanding, and analyzing space and movement in the 
natural world? While largely underappreciated, such basic 
conceptualizations are the first step in any analysis of a system, necessary 
priors to identifying the parts of the system, how those parts interact, what 
the boundaries of the system are, and how the parts move relative to each 
other. There is a tendency to assume that this reference frame or 
conceptualization is reality. The Mercator Projection must show the Earth as 
it really is. The Northern Hemisphere clearly is in the top half of the world, 
or at least should be. 
But this easy acceptance blithely sidesteps the problem that there are 
very different, though equally valid, conceptualizations of the system, 
including when the Northern Hemisphere is on the bottom of the map. 
 
 18  Id. 
 19  Martin W. Doyle & Scott H. Ensign, Alternative Reference Frames in River System 
Science, 59 BIOSCIENCE 499, 500 (2009). 
 20  Id.  
 21  Waze’s website states it is “one of the world’s largest community-based traffic and 
navigation app[s]. Join other drivers in your area who share real-time traffic and road info, 
saving everyone time and gas money on their daily commute.” Waze, https://www.waze.com 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
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Because in all systems there are constraints on what can be observed, 
measured, and modeled, the reference frame chosen a priori determines the 
data collected or the modeling approach taken. As a result, one may well ask 
whether reconceiving the system in a different reference frame leads to 
different assumptions about the way the system works. Would a different 
reference frame or a different map projection allow us to ask fundamentally 
different questions, suggesting completely different data and modeling 
choices? 
Using the Lagrangian and Eulerian reference frames as a model, this 
Article explores how our frame of reference shapes our understanding and 
application of environmental law. We are particularly interested in whether 
environmental law in the United States is predisposed toward Eulerian or 
Lagrangian reference frames and how, in turn, these reference frames 
influence the law. 
Our thesis is that environmental law is just as sensitive to frames of 
reference as fluid mechanics, cartography, and any other discipline that 
studies natural phenomena, and that this predetermines how we conceive of 
environmental problems and solutions far more than we realize. 
Geographers and fluid mechanics scientists understand this point. We argue 
that environmental lawyers should, as well. 
II. REFERENCE FRAMES IN FLUID DYNAMICS 
The first day of fieldwork in many introductory stream hydrology 
classes starts the same way: A class of students is taken to a river and asked 
to measure how fast the water is moving.22 This task is not so easy as may 
first appear. Because natural rivers have a large amount of variety in their 
shape, there are many different velocities of water in a river from one bank 
to the other. The challenge then is how to represent and measure velocity in 
a way that captures this variability. 
One option is to set up at a particular point in the river and measure the 
velocity of water moving past that location. This would mean using a 
velocity meter, and measuring velocity at different widths and depths in that 
spot. The class would then take the different measurements of velocity, 
perhaps average them together, and have a quantification of velocity at that 
particular place. This approach first requires choosing a particular place and 
then measuring the movement of many water parcels as they pass by. The 
reference frame is a static place and the movement of objects past it. The 
data collected reflects the conceptualization of the system. 
An enterprising group of students, though, might employ a quite 
different though equally valid approach by taking a bag of oranges—which 
have the same buoyancy as water—dumping the bag into the river and 
 
 22  See, e.g., COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING, UNIV. OF MASS. AMHERST, LAB EXERCISE #1: STREAM 
FLOW 1 (2010), available at http://www.ecs.umass.edu/cee/reckhow/courses/370/Lab1/Stream 
%20flow%20lab.pdf (providing students with details regarding their first lab exercise, a field trip 
to measure stream flows). 
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having each student follow a particular orange for some period of time. The 
distance traveled divided by time would be the velocity of the particular 
orange, and thus a quantification of the particular water pathway that 
carried that orange. All the different velocities of oranges could be averaged 
to give a single quantification of the streamflow velocity of the river. This 
approach requires choosing to not be fixed in a particular space, and instead 
to follow particular objects. 
Both groups of students are measuring the river velocity, though their 
answers and methods are very different. The Eulerian reference frame used 
by the first group is based on measuring the flux of objects through or within 
a spatially bounded area. The Lagrangian reference frame used by the 
second is based on tracking specific, identifiable objects through time. The 
methods are a function of the different conceptualizations of space and 
movement. 
 Eulerian and Lagrangian reference frames permeate the natural 
sciences, particularly the study of environmental phenomena. In researching 
sediment or chemicals in rivers, the standard practice has been to establish 
measuring stations and quantify the flux of materials or solutes past that 
location.23 The study of sediment and chemical transport phenomena is 
predominantly Eulerian and can use the changes in fluxes to infer processes 
that are occurring there. This approach to sediment and chemical solute 
study is entirely reasonable, as the objects of interest are difficult to 
distinguish from each other, making the Lagrangian approach logistically 
difficult. 
In the study of fish migration in river corridors, such as the anadromous 
salmon, it is possible to utilize both reference frames more easily. In rivers 
with declining or endangered populations of salmon, fish observation 
stations have been established in which the number of fish of a particular 
species migrating past the observation point are quantified; changes in this 
flux are used to infer the changes in quality of conditions and viability of the 
species as a whole. This method is shown in the figure below.24 
 
 
 23  See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME & WORLD HEALTH ORG., WATER QUALITY MONITORING: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF FRESHWATER QUALITY STUDIES AND 
MONITORING PROGRAMMES §§ 3.6–3.7 (Jamie Bartram & Richard Balance eds., 1996), available at 
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/resourcesquality/waterqualmonitor.pdf (explaining 
sampling site and sampling station selection processes). 
 24  Doyle & Ensign, supra note 19, at 501. 
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Alternatively, transponders attached to individual fish can record fish 
position through time and space to follow their movement through a river, 




Using the Eulerian reference frame, we might learn that there is a 
downward trend in salmon populations along a particular reach. Using the 
 
 25  Id. at 502. 
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Lagrangian reference frame, we might learn that over a week, eight out of 
ten salmon tracked tended to avoid areas with little riparian shading. Much 
like simply measuring water velocity, neither reference frame produces the 
correct answer any more than the other; they both produce answers 
particular to their respective reference frames. 
There are also subtler effects of reference frames in the natural 
sciences that are quite important, yet rarely recognized. First, reference 
frames, once chosen, can permeate into a discipline’s preconceived notions 
and perspectives, and shape foundational thinking. 
Consider the perspectives of famed father and son, Aldo Leopold—
godfather of conservation and author of the Sand County Almanac—and 
Luna Leopold—godfather of stream hydrology and winner of the National 
Medal of Science. In describing rivers, Luna Leopold observed: “It has been 
said that streams are the gutters down which flow the ruins of continents.”26 
In contrast, Aldo Leopold used a Lagrangian frame, describing rivers through 
the tortuous path of an individual atom, named X, whom he follows through 
a bur-oak, acorn, deer, and Indian, then on to a plover and into the soil again. 
He writes: 
Next he entered a tuft of side-oats grama, a buffalo, a buffalo chip, and again 
the soil. Next a spiderwort, a rabbit, and an owl. Thence a tuft of sporobolus. 
. . . . 
One year, while X lay in a cottonwood by the river, he was eaten by a beaver, 
an animal that always feeds higher than he dies. The beaver starved when his 
pond dried up during a bitter frost. X rode the carcass down the spring freshet, 
losing more altitude each hour than heretofore in a century. He ended up in the 
silt of a backwater bayou, where he fed a crayfish, a coon, and then an Indian, 
who laid him down to his last sleep in a mound on the riverbank.27 
Luna and Aldo Leopold’s descriptions are both accurate, but they present 
dramatically different conceptions of the physical system. 
Entire disciplines are in fact predisposed to adopt one or the other. For 
instance, compare two branches of ecology: behavioral ecology and 
ecosystem ecology. Behavioral ecology is rooted in the observation of 
individual organisms, the evolutionary history and adaptation of that 
species, and its behavior within particular environmental settings.28 One 
might point to the studies of MacArthur’s mapping of the movement of 
individual warblers through a forest as a starting point of this branch of 
ecology.29  That is, behavioral ecology is based largely on a Lagrangian 
reference frame. 
 
 26  LUNA B. LEOPOLD ET AL., FLUVIAL PROCESSES IN GEOMORPHOLOGY 97 (1964).  
 27  Aldo Leopold, Odyssey, AUDUBON MAG., May–June 1942, available at 
http://mag.audubon.org/articles/conservation/archives-aldo-leopolds-odyssey.  
 28  See PAUL COLINVAUX, ECOLOGY 2, at 154–56 (1993).  
 29  Id. 
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In contrast, ecosystem ecology is focused on the stores and fluxes of 
nutrients and energy through an ecosystem—a place.30 Ecosystem ecology 
sets aside the particulars of the organisms within the ecosystem and instead 
quantifies the effect of the ecosystem itself on energy and nutrients (or other 
chemical compounds) as they move through or are stored within that 
ecosystem. One might point to the essential work of Likens in quantifying 
the budgets of elements into and out of lakes or entire watersheds as 
quintessential ecosystem ecology.31 The particulars of the organisms or 
movement within the site of the organisms, and certainly the behavior of 
organisms, was only relevant insomuch as it affected the fluxes being 
measured. Ecosystem ecology has as its base, an Eulerian reference frame. 
It is not that one reference frame is more accurate than the other. It is 
that each reference frame is appropriate for the core questions being asked 
within that particular discipline and, as well, that each discipline is 
predisposed to utilizing a particular reference frame on topics that emerge. 
That is, almost regardless of the issue of interest, ecosystem ecologists will 
be predisposed to framing the issue and corresponding research questions 
via Eulerian reference frames while behavioral ecologists will likely frame 
questions in Lagrangian reference frames.32 
Reference frames within the natural sciences tend to be presupposed—
like map projections—and thus, the constraints and biases that they embody 
are passed on via their application, often without critical thought or 
reevaluation. Some scholars have suggested that these presupposed 
reference frames have restricted scientists’ ability to make novel insights or 
push the intellectual boundaries of their fields. Stuart Fisher, a prominent 
theoretical ecosystem ecologist whose early work adopted the Eulerian view 
of streams for ecosystem ecologists,33 has contended that a conceptual step 
is needed to move ecosystem ecology forward. Specifically, he suggested 
that the discipline needs to blur ecosystem boundaries rather than 
 
 30  See id. at 1, 10. 
 31  See generally G.E. Likens et al., The Calcium, Magnesium, Potassium, and Sodium 
Budgets for a Small Forested Ecosystem, 48 ECOLOGY 772 (1967) (providing an example of Gene 
E. Likens’ work on ecosystem budgets within six watersheds of the Hubbard Brook 
Experimental Forest in West Thornton, New Hampshire). 
 32  For instance, since the late 1980s there has been considerable growth in analyzing spatial 
patterns in landscape ecology. Of interest now in ecology is how the spatial structure of the 
landscape, such as habitat fragmentation, may affect ecological processes. As this new 
crosscutting approach to ecology has grown, behavioral ecologists and ecosystem ecologists 
have engaged it via their predilection for a particular reference frame. Behavioral ecologists 
have adopted Lagrangian reference frames to study how individual organisms (or species) 
might move through fragmented landscapes while ecosystem ecologists have adopted an 
Eulerian reference frame (often of the same studied landscape types) to quantify how 
fragmentation affects the fluxes of nutrients. See Monica G. Turner, Landscape Ecology in 
North America: Past, Present, and Future, 86 ECOLOGY 1967, 1967–69, 1971–72 (2005).  
 33  Stuart G. Fisher & Gene E. Likens, Energy Flow in Bear Brook, New Hampshire: An 
Integrative Approach to Stream Ecosystem Metabolism, 43 ECOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 421, 421 
(1973).  
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accentuate them.34 To do so, to break the dominant paradigm in ecosystem 
ecology, he proposed a simple exercise of: 
. . . following water from the hill slope and into the channel as one way of 
doing this—essentially adopting a more Lagrangian view of stream ecosystems. 
Following a particle or organism through space may be an efficient way of 
deconstructing preconceived boundaries or notions of processes, and 
potentially eliciting alternative research questions and agenda.35 
What Fisher’s ‘call to creativity’ shows is that preconceived reference 
frames take on a role almost in and of themselves in shaping many 
disciplines, and that to break out of the myopia that may develop over time, 
natural scientists may need to be intentional in altering their reference 
frames in order to generate new research questions and move the discipline 
forward. 
The second subtle effect of reference frames is that they affect which 
questions are asked or what the scope of an entire research discipline might 
be. That is, once a reference frame has become predominant in a discipline, 
entire classes of questions or research agenda may be ignored, or even 
appear nonsensical. For instance, the field of river geomorphology is the 
study of the shape of the earth’s surface with particular focus on rivers.36 The 
shape of the earth is set by the location of rock and sediment, and so 
erosion, transport, and deposition are the primary foci of geomorphology.37 
The primary growth phase of the science of geomorphology was in the mid-
twentieth century, and many of the leading geomorphologists were trained 
initially as hydraulic engineers.38 The reference frame that they adopted to 
study sediment movement was Eulerian, and they applied hydraulic 
principles to the study of sediment as the fluxes of sediment into and out of 
river reaches of interest and the physical flow characteristics that change 
the sediment loads.39 Thus, traditional Eulerian sediment transport and river 
geomorphology sit almost exclusively in the realm of physics and 
mechanics. 
However, if instead of fluxes of sediment we were to focus on a 
particular sediment particle, the most striking thing that would emerge 
would be that as the sediment particle is transported from its mountain 
origin to its oceanic finality, the vast majority of its time is spent not in 
 
 34  Doyle & Ensign, supra note 19, at 507. 
 35  Id. 
 36  See KENNETH J. GREGORY & ANDREW S. GOUDIE, THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF 
GEOMORPHOLOGY 1 (Kenneth J. Gregory & Andrew S. Goudie eds., 2011). 
 37  See Jeff Warburton, Sediment Transport and Deposition, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF 
GEOMORPHOLOGY 326 (Kenneth J. Gregory & Andrew S. Goudie eds., 2011). 
 38  See Andrew Goudie, Geomorphology: Its Early History, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF 
GEOMORPHOLOGY 23, 25 (Kenneth J. Gregory & Andrew S. Goudie eds., 2011). See, e.g., ANN L. 
RILEY, River Scientists, in RESTORING STREAMS IN CITIES: A GUIDE FOR PLANNERS, POLICYMAKERS, 
AND CITIZENS 111, 112 (1998). 
 39  KEITH J. TINKLER, A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOMORPHOLOGY 203 (1985). 
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motion, but as sediment deposited. As sediment is transported downstream, 
it is often deposited in bars or on floodplains, where it might sit for centuries 
or millennia.40 While deposited, sediment particles undergo a variety of 
geochemical processes that can change their basic characteristics (i.e., 
chemical weathering).41 Thus, a Lagrangian approach to sediment transport 
and river geomorphology inevitably leads to the realm of chemistry.42 That is, 
the normative questions of a discipline can flow directly out of a 
presupposed reference frame. 
III. REFERENCE FRAMES IN THE LAW 
At one level, the idea of legal reference frames is obvious. The simplest 
and most pervasive use is line drawing. Law by its very nature is binary. 
Statutes and the common law create boundary lines. You are either in or out, 
subject to the law’s strictures or not. Consider jurisdiction. The government 
cannot enforce against a pollution source beyond the reach of the court. A 
Los Angeles resident cannot sue a Chinese power plant under the Clean Air 
Act, even if she can trace the movement of its air pollution across the 
Pacific. The same is true for standing. A person can sue in court, as can a 
corporation.43 A tree and a Lorax, alas, cannot.44 Proximate causation serves 
as the line in negligence. Judges need to draw a line to keep some damage 
claims out of court. As Justice Cardozo memorably observed and Mrs. 
Palsgraf ruefully learned, negligence is not in the air.45 
Our focus is on a less obvious act of framing, though equally prevalent. 
Our concern is how we measure the physical system, how we conceive of 
the legally significant action in the environment. Under the Clean Air Act, 
what is the proper frame for measuring pollution? Should we trace, for 
example, emissions from a specific smokestack to the impact on an 
individual receptor or measure ambient air concentrations in the general 
airshed? Is the proper frame for the Endangered Species Act the impact of 
actions on an individual or on a population? These framing decisions are 
different from jurisdictional scope. They bring into question the nature of 
the system itself—the collection of particular actions, actors, and areas we 
seek to regulate. In the paragraphs below, we consider whether Eulerian and 
Lagrangian frames of reference map onto environmental law. It turns out the 
fit is very close indeed. 
 
 40  See ALISTAIR F. PITTY, INTRODUCTION TO GEOMORPHOLOGY 229–30 (1971). 
 41  See generally DOROTHY MERRITTS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL GEOLOGY: AN EARTH SYSTEM 
SCIENCE APPROACH 164 (1998) (discussing the general process of chemical weathering and the 
products that result). 
 42  ROBERT H. MEADE, TRANSCONTINENTIAL MOVING AND STORAGE: THE ORINOCO AND AMAZON 
RIVERS TRANSFER THE ANDES TO THE ATLANTIC, in LARGE RIVERS 45, 47 (Avijit Gupta ed., 2007).  
 43  See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 (2010) (holding that 
corporations have First Amendment free speech rights). 
 44  See DR. SEUSS, THE LORAX (1971) (“I am the Lorax. I speak for the trees. I speak for the 
trees, for the trees have no tongues.” And sadly neither does the Lorax in the court system.). 
 45  Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
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Let’s start with the Clean Water Act. One of the basic divisions in this 
law is the distinction between point source and nonpoint source pollution, 
basically pollution flowing from pipes versus from fields and roads.46 The 
regulation of point sources is largely framed through a Lagrangian approach. 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits are 
required for individual sources and establish specific control technologies 
the sources must employ. Whether the sum of point sources causes overall 
water quality problems to the larger river or lake is not immediately 
considered. 
Contrast that with nonpoint source pollution, which is treated within an 
Eulerian frame. The Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program seeks to 
calculate the overall fluxes or pollutant budget into a water body.47 Indeed, 
the very term TMDL refers to the overall pollutant load that a water body 
can accept while meeting water quality limits—Eulerian in all but name. 
The Water Quality Standards program—where individual NPDES 
permits are revised based on meeting the TMDL48—represents a hybrid 
approach, where the Eulerian frame of the water body is combined with the 
Lagrangian frame for allocating contributions from each individual source. 
One can also see different reference frames at work in the wetlands 
mitigation banking program. Starting with President George H.W. Bush, 
every subsequent President has adopted a “No Net Loss” strategy for 
wetlands.49 This has been achieved through the section 404 program of the 
Clean Water Act, which authorizes the Secretary of the Army to “issue 
permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of 
dredged or fill material into navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”50 
These permits, administered principally through the Army Corps of 
Engineers (Corps)51 and known ubiquitously as “404 permits,” should be 
issued using a “sequencing” approach. The first preference is to require the 
applicant to avoid filling wetland resources, followed by minimization of 
adverse impacts to those wetlands that cannot reasonably be avoided, 
 
 46  Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)–(14) (2006). 
 47  Id. § 1313(d)(3). 
 48  EPA, EPA-823-B-12-002, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, ch. 7, at 1, 7 (1994), 
available at http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/handbook/chapter07.cfm. 
 49  See 40 C.F.R. § 257.9 (2013) (establishing the “no net loss” policy); JAMES SALZMAN & J. B. 
RUHL, “NO NET LOSS”: INSTRUMENT CHOICE IN WETLANDS PROTECTION 1 (2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=796771; OBAMA FOR AMERICA, BARACK OBAMA: SUPPORTING THE RIGHTS 
AND TRADITIONS OF SPORTSMEN (2008), available at http://www.google.com/ 
url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CC8QFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fobama.
3cdn.net%2F75994105496e31ff83_guzfmvkls.pdf&ei=xXqVUqetO8ndoATauIDIAQ&usg=AFQjCN
GYvmXmy0onfnkDozaTuBihjgFTwQ&bvm=bv.57155469,d.cGE&cad=rja (stating the campaign 
promise to continue the wetlands “no net loss” policy); Louis Jacobson, Partial Progress on 
Several Elements of Wetlands Protection, POLITIFACT, Nov. 29, 2012, http://www. 
politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/282/support-wetlands-protection/ (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2014) (assessing the campaign promise to continue the wetlands “no net loss” 
policy). 
 50  33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006). 
 51  Id. § 1344(b). 
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followed by the least desirable option of providing compensatory mitigation 
for those unavoidable adverse impacts that remain after all minimization 
measures have been exercised.52 This latter option is essentially an offset 
program: For X acres of wetlands impacted, Y acres had to be conserved or 
restored. 
In the early years of wetlands mitigation, the Corps took a Lagrangian 
perspective for implementing the compensatory mitigation requirements.53 
Each project was considered individually and mitigation required onsite, in-
kind restoration. The success of restoration was assessed as matching the 
restoration against the harm on that particular site; impact and offset were 
definitively linked. While attractive in theory, the project-by-project 
compensatory mitigation approach was widely regarded as having failed 
miserably in terms of environmental protection.54 Whether onsite or nearsite, 
the piecemeal approach complicated the Corps’ ability to articulate 
mitigation performance standards, monitor success, and enforce conditions. 
Many developers went through the motions of so called “landscape 
mitigation”—planting what was required or regrading where required to 
meet the minimum letter of the permit—then moved on.55 
In light of these problems, the Corps and EPA started shifting 
compensatory activities from onsite to offsite mitigation, thus opening the 
door to wetlands mitigation banking.56 This approach allows a developer 
who has mitigated somewhere else in advance of development to draw from 
the resulting bank of mitigation “credits” as the development is implemented 
and wetlands are filled.57 The concept progressed beyond this personal bank 
model, as large commercial and public wetlands banks, not tied to a 
particular development, sell mitigation credits to third party developers in 
need of compensatory mitigation.58 Wetland mitigation banking now 
resembles a commodity market, with freewheeling, entrepreneurial wetlands 
banks offering for sale (and profit) finished, offsite wetlands as credits to 
anyone who is in need of mitigation for their 404 permits.59 
 
 52  See Memorandums of Agreement (MOA); Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines; 
Correction, 55 Fed. Reg. 9,210, 9,211–12 (Mar. 12, 1990). 
 53 See, e.g., Doyle & Ensign, supra note 19, at 500; Michael J. Bean & Lynn E. Dwyer, 
Mitigation Banking as an Endangered Species Conservation Tool, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10,537, 10,538 (2000). 
 54  Bean & Dwyer, supra note 53, at 10,538. 
 55  Keith Bowers, What Is Wetlands Mitigation?, LAND DEV., Winter 1993, at 28, 33 (1993). 
 56 See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Apples for Oranges: The Role of Currencies in 
Environmental Trading Markets, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,438, 11,456 (2001). 
 57  William W. Sapp, Mitigation Banking: Panacea or Poison for Wetlands Protection, 1 
ENVTL. LAW 99, 108 (1994) (“In a single-user bank, the ‘banker’ and the ‘user’ are the same 
entity.”). 
 58  ENVTL. LAW INST., WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING 120–23 (1993) (describing four types of 
commercial and public mitigation banks). 
 59  See William W. Sapp, The Supply-Side and Demand-Side of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 
74 OR. L. REV. 951, 968–73 (1995) (explaining economies of scale in mitigation banking and 
profitability to mitigation bankers). 
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Onsite, project-by-project mitigation was classic Lagrangian, in that the 
credits were the object being tracked. Mitigation success was tied to the 
success of the specific restoration project replacing the losses from the 
original wetland. The move to wetlands mitigation banking required a 
significant intellectual shift to an Eulerian frame of reference. To mitigate 
under wetlands banking, a developer need only buy a credit from a bank 
somewhere else in the same watershed.60 “No net loss” shifted from no net 
loss of that particular wetland to no net loss of cumulative wetlands.61 The 
problem became viewed as managing a flux, balancing overall gains and 
losses of wetlands. 
Once a credit is approved by the Corps for compensatory mitigation, it 
loses its individuality. The permittee/buyer does not care if it is a good 
restoration or a bad restoration. This is particularly true for in lieu fee 
programs, in which the arrows linking impact to compensation are 
malleable. They don’t point to each other, they essentially point to a great 
credit silo where deposits and debits are inventoried, and the particular 
credits are churned from individuals to homogeneity. The nuance of a 
particular ecosystem is completely subsumed into a large spreadsheet in the 
cloud balancing the books of natural capital. 
This is true for other restoration markets as well. To gain the 
efficiencies of scale and engage a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, 
market designers necessarily abandon the importance of individuality to 
allow the gains of the market to operate.62 Fungibility, an Eulerian 
perspective balancing cumulative impacts and cumulative credits, must 
dominate over a Lagrangian frame, which necessitates tracking a specific 
credit to a specific offset, essentially one-to-one trading.63 
Outside the mitigation context, there are other examples of how 
wetlands regulations are couched in different reference frames, and how 
these differences influence legal interpretation. The Eulerian/Lagrangian 
 
 60  ENVTL. LAW INST., BANKS AND FEES: THE STATUS OF OFF-SITE WETLAND MITIGATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 27 (2002), available at http://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d12_08.pdf. 
 61  See, e.g., Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 
19,601 (Apr. 10, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230) (stating that offsite mitigation may better 
support the no net loss goal for wetlands than onsite mitigation). 
 62  See, e.g., Shirley Jeanne Whitsitt, Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 441, 469 
(1997) (discussing the importance of avoiding defining service areas for credit ventures too 
narrowly in order to increase demand for credits). 
 63  In the book Nature’s Metropolis, Historian William Cronon provides a fascinating 
account of the same transition in the development of wheat futures markets in the 19th century. 
Cronon follows a bushel of wheat through the market from farm to final sale. When transported 
by river, the bushel remained in a bag and therefore distinct. It had to be priced by its individual 
quality. However, once trains and grain elevators became popular, wheat was bulked and rated 
into classes (taken out of bags from farmers and put in bulk onto trains and eventually into 
grain elevators), making it easier to handle and price. In the process, it lost its individuality. 
WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST 142–47 (1991). The shift 
from individual to bulk identification of commodities could equally well be described as a shift 
from Lagrangian to Eulerian frames. 
TOJCI.SALZMAN 3/11/2014  3:00 PM 
2014] FRAMES OF REFERENCE & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 19 
 
distinction is perhaps most clearly evident in Rapanos v. United States.64 This 
case raised the issue of whether isolated wetlands connected to navigable 
waters through streams and conduits should also be considered navigable 
waters subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act.65 While the 
implications of the split verdict in Rapanos have remained murky,66 the oral 
arguments were crystal clear in setting out the choice between an Eulerian 
and Lagrangian frame of reference. 
The lawyer for Rapanos argued that a specific, hydrologic link must be 
established between the navigable water and the body of water upstream 
subject to regulation.67 This was, in essence, a hardline Lagrangian tack. In 
his questioning, Justice Souter recognized the implications: 
The functional reason [to regulate adjacent wetlands upstream of a 
traditionally navigable water] is that if you put the poison in the adjacent 
wetland, it’s going to get into the navigable water. Exactly the same argument 
can be made as you go further and further up the tributaries, and it seems to 
me that once you concede, as I think you have to, that there can be a regulation 
that goes beyond literally navigable water at the point at which the . . . 
pollutant is added, then you have to follow the same logic right up through the 
watershed to . . . any point at which a pollutant, once added, will eventually get 
into the navigable water.68 
For Souter, a Lagrangian approach would require developing tracers from 
specific upstream sources to navigable waters, at which point they could be 
subject to regulation. This, however, would impose a significant logistical 
challenge on the regulators: “You mean . . . in every case then . . . a scientist 
would have to analyze the molecules . . . and trace them up, and so long as 
they . . . could trace it [sic] to a specific discharge, they could get at it [to 
regulate], but otherwise they couldn’t?”69 The Solicitor General made a 
similar argument: 
One way of [establishing a connection between navigable waters and distant 
water bodies] . . . would be this impossible sort of process of trying to 
fingerprint or DNA test oil spills in a tributary to figure out, yes, that’s the guy 
that got it to the navigable waters. And the one thing we know is that there 
were some efforts to try to regulate pollution that way before 1972 and they 
were a dismal failure.70 
Instead, the Government argued that the upstream wetlands and 
tributaries should be classified based on their characteristics and location, 
 
 64  547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 65  Id. at 729. 
 66  Clifton Cottrell, The “Wetlands Adjacent to Non-Navigable Waters” Less Traveled: Clean 
Water Act Jurisdiction and the Fifth Circuit, 43 TEX. ENVT’L L. J. 19, 32 (2012). 
 67  See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739–40. 
 68  Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 (Nos. 04-1034, 04-1384). 
 69  Id. at 8. 
 70  Id. at 57. 
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from which their connection to downstream waters could be inferred. This 
approach is essentially Eulerian: The cumulative landscape upstream results 
in some net pollution level downstream. This line of thinking does not 
require a specific Lagrangian link to be made from downstream water to an 
upstream wetlands or tributary. Rather, it requires a broader systems view 
for water pollution and the landscape processes. In fact, this was the central 
vision behind Justice Kennedy’s controlling concurrence: 
Through regulations or adjudication, the Corps may choose to identify 
categories of tributaries that, due to their volume of flow (either annually or on 
average), their proximity to navigable waters, or other relevant considerations, 
are significant enough that wetlands adjacent to them are likely, in the majority 
of cases, to perform important functions for an aquatic system incorporating 
navigable waters. 71 
This is a classic Eulerian framing, looking to the large-scale attributes rather 
than tracing individual pollutants. It is worth noting in this regard that one of 
the essential elements of the Government’s defense of its categorical 
approach was the logistical impossibility of tracing specific molecules of a 
pollutant to a specific polluter upstream.72 This had been the case prior to 
the Clean Water Act’s adoption in 1972 and, the Government contended, it 
remains relevant and dominant today.73 We return to this point in the last 
Part of this Article. 
Or consider the aftermath of the Rapanos decision. The EPA has 
recently released a study of peer reviewed, scientific literature on the 
physical, biological, and chemical linkages between isolated waters and 
navigable waters.74 EPA is also preparing a rule on this topic for submission 
to the White House.75 While the details of the rule are still unknown, reports 
indicate that it will rely on “connectivity” between specific water bodies and 
navigable waters in order to assert federal jurisdiction.76 The Government 
will therefore rely on the flow connecting the waters rather than the mere 
category of the water body itself. If so, the Clean Water Act may soon take 
on a stronger Lagrangian frame of reference. 
The dichotomy between Eulerian and Lagrangian frames of reference 
extends far beyond the Clean Water Act. In the Clean Air Act, for example, 
 
 71  Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 72  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 8. 
 73  Though this may be changing. EPA, Clean Water Act Definition of “Waters of the United 
States” http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/CWAwaters.cfm (last visited Nov. 24, 
2013) [hereinafter Draft Rule Article]. 
 74  EPA, EPA/600/R-11/098B, CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM 
WATERS: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1-1 (2013). 
 75  Draft Rule Article, supra note 73. 
 76  Indeed, the title of EPA’s draft report is “Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to 
Downstream Waters: A Review and Synthesis of the Scientific Evidence (Sept. 2013 External 
Review Draft, EPA/600/R-11/098B).” Notification of a Public Meeting of the Science Advisory 
Board Panel for the Review of the EPA Water Body Connectivity Report, 78 Fed. Reg. 58,536, 
58,536 (Sept. 24, 2013).   
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the use of “bubbling” treats the facility as an Eulerian system of 
smokestacks. If the net emissions of a facility do not increase, there is no 
need to revise the facility’s permit.77 A Lagrangian approach would focus on 
the emissions of each discrete stationary source. This is equally evident in 
the acid rain trading program in Title IV.78 A Lagrangian approach would 
follow emissions from Midwestern power plants up the coast until they 
ended up as acid deposition in the Northeast, and then regulate individual 
sources. Instead, just as occurred with wetlands mitigation banking79 and the 
Chicago wheat exchange,80 the Clean Air Act renders sulfur dioxide pollution 
fungible and establishes a nationwide cap to reduce net emissions.81 This 
approach, which ensures a viable trading market, makes little sense from a 
Lagrangian perspective but perfect sense from an Eulerian view. 
Or consider the Endangered Species Act (ESA),82 where Eulerian and 
Lagrangian frames of reference also are evident. Under the ESA, a species 
may be listed as “endangered” if it is in danger of extinction in all or a 
significant portion of range.83 But should this judgment be made in reference 
to the current range—a static, Eulerian snapshot—or the species’ historic 
range, which has been shrinking for decades or even centuries—a 
Lagrangian frame moving over time? Migratory corridors provide a different 
context. In tracking migratory birds, biologists usually look at populations at 
both the nesting and wintering grounds, measuring whether there has been 
mortality in the migration between the two.84 This is an Eulerian frame of 
reference. But what about how the birds got there? Tracing individual birds’ 
paths would be Lagrangian. For example, the wind power industry has faced 
criticism in light of the concern that whooping cranes will attempt to avoid 
windmills resulting in longer migration patterns, meaning they have less 
energy when they arrive.85 The Lagrangian frame would suggest the same 
number of birds as the Eulerian frame but have a different understanding of 
their condition because of the route they took, and thus, different 
implications for whether the ESA is relevant to wind farms. 
 
 77  This is the rule affirmed in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 854 (1984). The rule was originally described in the Federal Register, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 14, 1981).  
 78  See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (2006) (laying out Congress’s purpose in creating 
an allocation and transfer program for emissions). 
 79  See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 80  See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 81  42 U.S.C. § 7651c(a) (2006). 
 82  Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (1973). 
 83 Id. § 1532(6). 
 84  See, e.g., Kevin C. Fraser et al., Continent-Wide Tracking to Determine Migratory 
Connectivity and Tropical Habitat Associations of a Declining Aerial Insectivore, PROC. OF THE 
ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI., Dec. 2012, at 4,901–02, available at http://rspb. 
royalsocietypublishing.org/content/279/1749/4901.full.  
 85  See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., WHOOPING CRANES AND WIND DEVELOPMENT–AN 
ISSUE PAPER 18 (2009).  
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We could go on, but the point is clear. Lagrangian and Eulerian frames 
of reference are commonplace in environmental law. As a descriptive 
matter, this seems quite obvious. The key question is why it matters. 
IV. WHAT DO REFERENCE FRAMES MEAN FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW? 
The realization that much of environmental law can be described in 
terms of Eulerian and Lagrangian reference frames is interesting, but we 
believe it raises two important questions. The first is why we see different 
frames in the law. What drives the choice of an Eulerian frame in some 
settings and a Lagrangian frame in others? 
One reason is conceptual. There are certain environmental problems 
that are best considered as a flux rather than as a set of individual actors. 
Indeed, tracing individuals may lose the property of the system that we care 
about. It may be sufficient, for example, to focus only on the population 
level of a species or the overall concentrations of a global pollutant. The 
more important reason, though, is practical. 
In many instances, it is infeasible or impossible to trace individuals. 
That was Justice Souter’s concern in the Rapanos oral argument—scientists 
cannot trace molecules back to a specific discharge, so that cannot be the 
basis for regulation.86 The Solicitor General reinforced this point, arguing 
that this approach had been tried in the past and failed.87 The same would be 
true for air pollution. What we really care about is the impact of air pollution 
on an individual, but it is too difficult to trace the source of pollutants in a 
mixed airshed and the susceptibility of individuals. 
This was also evident in our earlier discussion of salmon research and 
the choice between studying the movement of fish populations or tracing the 
path of individual salmon.88 The Eulerian approach is most suitable for small, 
indistinguishable or interchangeable objects with little individuality that 
might influence their behavior and movement. It is the natural reference 
frame for flux-based questions and problems. But it imposes limitations. 
Because the Eulerian reference frame views the system as a black box, it is 
not able to provide insight into what happens within the boundaries at which 
measurements are taken. 
The Eulerian approach deliberately obscures internal processes: The 
processes and effects are inferred based on the output from the area 
bounded for the study. Moreover, the results are entirely dependent on the 
sampling locations chosen and which boundaries are assumed to exist.89 The 
investigator must select the study areas and the sampling locations a priori, 
and the representativeness of these sites is essential to the insights gained 
from the data. Results vary as a function of where boundaries are drawn. 
 
 86  Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 728–29 (2006).  
 87  Id.  
 88  See discussion supra Part I. 
 89  For a general discussion on the central role of monitoring in environmental law, see Eric 
Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
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Temporally, the resolution of data collection or the timing of collection 
biases the utility of the data. Measuring the flow of traffic under a bridge 
may not show where the real bottlenecks are. 
The Lagrangian reference frame, in contrast, works well for objects that 
exhibit individual behavior. But it is limited by the ability to observe a 
number of objects by the availability of appropriate tracer technology—
either physical transponders or chemical isotopes—and particularly the 
ability to trace objects over long periods of time: In most cases, the efficacy 
of a tracer diminishes over time. Consequently, most Lagrangian studies 
involve large objects, such as large birds or rare radioactive elements.90 
Salmon are much easier to track and follow individually than are sediment 
particles, but there are only so many salmon that could be sufficiently 
monitored with transponders, and so insight must be shaped by a small 
number of observations. If individuals behave similarly, then the Lagrangian 
approach would reveal insights into typical behavior—the more 
idiosyncratic each salmon is, the more problematic it is to understand the 
group as a whole from the observations of the few. 
The central importance of monitoring capacity in choosing reference 
frames is clearly the case for water pollution. As Stephenson and Shabman 
describe: 
A point source is one where it is technically and financially feasible to trace the 
pollutant back to an originating location [and therefore Lagrangian]. In 
contrast, a nonpoint source is often characterized by the following conditions: 
a lack of monitoring technology for linking pollutants to their source; costs for 
tracking pollutants to their source in excess of available resources; or political 
opposition from nonpoint sources who could face . . . limits . . . . For one or 
more of these reasons, nonpoint sources are beyond the reach of the CWA and 
NPDES permits for point sources are the only CWA-authorized instrument 
limiting pollutant discharges. This is the case even though, in many places, 
nonpoint source loads are the reason water quality standards are not met [and 
therefore measured through an Eurlerian reference frame].91 
Put simply, because of monitoring limitations, most of our environmental 
laws have Eulerian reference frames. But this begs a second question: What 
if the technology changed? What if you could trace everything and identify 
everyone’s sensitivity? What would environmental law look like then? 
To give a preview of what might lie in store, realize that we are seeing 
rapid development of very lightweight transponders, chemical tracers, DNA 
tracing, and even cell phones.92 These technological advances have all led to 
 
 90  Doyle & Ensign, supra note 19, at 500–01. 
 91  Kurt Stephenson & Leonard Shabman, Rhetoric and Reality of Water Quality Trading and 
the Potential for Market-Like Reform, 47 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 15, 17 (2011). 
 92  For a discussion of how technological advances in monitoring were influencing 
environmental law in 2003, see Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information 
Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115 (2004). See also Dave Owen, Mapping, Modeling, and the 
Fragmentation of Environmental Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 219, 251–81 (discussing spatial 
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a surge in the use of Lagrangian techniques in the study of environmental 
and even sociological phenomena. Consider, for example, the startup 
company, BaseTrace.93 Founded by recent Duke graduates, BaseTrace has 
developed tracers that can be mixed in hydraulic fracturing fluids. The 
tracers contain readily identifiable DNA strands that will stay in the fluid no 
matter where it goes.94 As a result, it may soon be possible—indeed, easy—to 
establish definitively whether a particular fracking site’s fluids contaminate 
drinking water supplies through DNA fingerprinting. The company’s product 
has generated a great deal of interest in the venture capital community.95 
New technology is changing the possible frames of reference. If 
adopted, the BaseTrace technology will allow Lagrangian analysis of 
fracking fluids and potentially change the contours of liability. But we can go 
even further. Given the pace of technology, it is not farfetched to assume 
that we may be able to trace the specific path of virtually anything—from 
water parcel to organism—in the coming decades. 
As tracers have become more robust in other fields, they have also 
enabled the Lagrangian approach over longer periods of time, which leads to 
the primary advantage of the Lagrangian approach over the Eulerian 
approach in natural science—the boundaries of the system are not 
presupposed. By following an individual object through space and time, it is 
possible that boundaries initially thought present may be more permeable 
than imagined.96 For instance, the development and application of stable 
isotopes has allowed ecologists to identify and quantify the movement of 
chemicals and organisms between regions that had typically been 
considered distinct; there is now substantial understanding of the 
interaction between water in stream channels and groundwater.97 
To assess how this might change environmental law, in particular, 
consider two examples from the Clean Air Act98 described below. The first 
concerns the challenges posed by advances in genomics. 
 
mapping’s effects, or lack thereof, on environmental law and spatial mapping’s ability to solve 
problems posed by environmental law).  
 93  BaseTrace, Home, www.basetrace.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
 94  BaseTrace, About Our Technology, www.basetrace.com/technology (last visited Feb. 22, 
2014). 
 95  Amanda Jones Hoyle, Through Challenge, Early Stagers Getting Help, TRIANGLE BUS. J., 
July 12, 2013, http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/print-edition/2013/07/12/through-challenge- 
early-stagers.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).  
 96  See, e.g., Randall Kochevar, Following a Dream, and Tuna, with Electronic Tagging, 
STANFORD REP., Feb. 25, 2004, http://news.stanford.edu/news/2004/february25/aaas-blocksr-
225.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014) (discussing how marine biologist Barbara Block tagged and 
tracked individual Bluefin tuna, demonstrating that they migrate from the eastern coast of the 
United States all the way to the Mediterranean, therefore making clear that conservation efforts 
for the stock must take place in both jurisdictions). 
 97  See generally STREAMS AND GROUND WATERS (Jeremy B. Jones & Patrick J. Mulholland 
eds., 2000) (explaining the “surface–subsurface exchange processes in streams” and 
demonstrating the “robust understanding” of these processes in the field). 
 98  Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006). 
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Under the Clean Air Act, National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) must be set at a level “requisite to protect the public health” with 
“an adequate margin of safety.”99 The question this begs, of course, is: Who is 
the public? Based on Lead Industries Association v. EPA, 100 CAA 
amendments,101 and agency policy,102 the EPA has set its NAAQS at levels 
protective of sensitive subgroups with “significantly higher probability of 
developing a condition, illness, or other abnormal status” from pollutant 
exposure than the rest of the population.103 
When revising the ozone air quality standard in 1979, for example, the 
standard was aimed “not only on the most sensitive population group, but 
also on a very sensitive portion of that group (specifically, those persons 
who are more sensitive than 99 percent of the sensitive group, but less 
sensitive than 1 percent of that group).”104 When developing the NAAQS for 
lead in 1978, the level was set so it would protect 99.5% of children, defined 
as the most sensitive population group.105 
While this approach is highly protective, it also poses a challenge in 
light of recent advances in genetics. As Gary Marchant has written: 
It has long been observed that individuals differ in their response to exposures 
to air pollutants such as ozone and particulate matter, but it is only in recent 
years that the genetic basis of this variable response has been identified. 
. . . . 
. . . [I]ndividuals with a genetic condition called α1-antitrypsin deficiency are 
prone to developing chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), 
especially when exposed to tobacco smoke or airborne particulate matter. 
Similarly, many genetic variants have been identified that appear to predispose 
an individual to developing asthma, which in turn makes the individual more 
susceptible to adverse health effects from air pollution exposures. 
This growing data set indicates that there are significant genetic 
susceptibilities to ambient air pollutants in the general population. The issue 
then presented is whether and how this information can and should be used to 
better protect genetically susceptible individuals. . . . [W]e are reaching the 
point of scientific understanding where we can start utilizing genetic 
 
 99  Id. § 7409(b)(1). 
 100  See 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the Administrator did not exceed his 
authority by promulgating the standards based on protecting children from “subclinical” effects 
of lead exposure which had not been shown to be harmful to health). 
 101  40 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2013). 
 102  See Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Congress defined public 
health broadly. NAAQS must protect not only average healthy individuals, but also ‘sensitive 
citizens’ . . . [who are] particularly vulnerable to air pollution.”).  
 103  EPA, EPA-600/8-77-017, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR LEAD 13-11 (1977). 
 104  Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Photochemical Oxidants, 44 
Fed. Reg. 8,202, 8,215 (Feb. 8, 1979). 
 105  Lead Indus. Ass’n, 647 F.2d at 1144–45. 
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information to tailor our environmental and public health policies to better 
protect susceptible individuals . . . .106 
The CAA operates as an Eulerian system if our concern is about 
ambient concentrations and their effects on populations. A truly Lagrangian 
approach would regulate from specific source to specific individual. If we 
can now identify hypersensitive individuals and trace the pollutants back to 
their source, does the CAA require setting the NAAQS at the level necessary 
to protect them? Marchant argues that this is the direction we are 
necessarily heading. He concludes that: 
It is probably a matter of when, not whether, genetic information will play a 
major role in our air pollution protection programs. As we continue to control 
and reduce air pollution exposures, the remaining health effects will be 
increasingly clustered in vulnerable people who have a genetic or other 
susceptibility that makes them particularly sensitive to air pollution.107 
This plays into our second example—microclimates under the Clean Air 
Act (CAA). As Professor Ann Carlson has demonstrated, microclimates can 
be created by proximity to mobile sources and these pose serious challenges 
for the Clean Air Act.108 Diesel engines, in particular, can create hot spots in 
tightly bounded locations near highways and intersections where the air 
quality is well in excess of the NAAQS standards.109 And this occurs in air 
quality control regions that are regarded as in attainment. As a result, the 
poor local air quality is effectively masked by the stamp of approval for the 
airshed. 
Carlson does not use the vocabulary of Euler and Lagrange, but their 
applicability is evident in her description below: 
The concept of “ambient” as implemented under the CAA is applied to 
precisely the opposite of microclimates. Instead, attainment is measured for 
large geographic areas—designated by the Environmental Protection Agency 
after consultation with individual states—even though those areas may have 
very different air quality within their jurisdictional borders. 
Using a small number of monitors to measure ambient air quality over a large 
geographic area, by definition, simply ignores many microclimates. . . . [The 
Southern California air quality district] uses 35 monitoring stations around its 
almost 11,000 mile basin to measure air quality, a number higher than required 
by federal regulation. The stations cannot, obviously, measure the quality of 
 
 106  Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Susceptibilities: The Future Driver of Ambient Air Quality 
Standards?, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 791, 796–98 (2011). 
 107  Id. at 807.  
 108  Ann E. Carlson, Microclimates and Air Pollution (forthcoming 2014). 
 109  Id. at 2. 
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the air across the potentially thousands of microclimates that exist within its 
borders.110 
Due to awareness of this problem, there has been pressure from 
environmental justice groups to place additional monitoring stations in 
hotspots,111 increasing the granularity of what is essentially an Eulerian 
reference frame. Perhaps surprisingly, EPA has blocked these efforts.112 
Carlson reports that “EPA regulations prohibit using microclimate 
monitoring to establish ambient limits and the agency has opposed requiring 
the monitoring of near road microclimates for certain air pollutants. The 
Ninth Circuit upheld EPA’s regulations prohibiting the use of monitors near 
pollution hotspots to establish ambient levels in Physicians for Social 
Responsibility v. EPA.”113 
Let’s now consider what would happen in the two preceding 
technologies if the technology changed. What would environmental law look 
like if you could trace the sources of every pollutant and their impact on 
every receptor? What if you could identify everyone’s sensitivity? Would this 
allow us to pivot from an Eulerian to Lagrangian reference frame, and would 
this pivot matter for environmental law? 
Let’s reconsider the airshed with microclimate hotpots. The air quality 
monitors currently operate in an Eulerian frame. We can add more monitors 
and gain greater granularity, but the frame is still stationary. It’s like adding 
more road cams to monitor traffic. To make the Lagrangian pivot, we need 
to let the monitor move. The first easy Lagrangian move would be to use a 
mobile lab and drive around the city. With this stream of data coming into an 
EPA database, officials could map the hotspots at different resolutions in 
time and space. But why stop with moving labs? Why not allow people to 
buy small air samplers they can put on their cars and go about their daily 
lives, monitoring the impacts when and where they are encountered? The 
data resolution would increase dramatically. 
 
 110  Id. at 5, 8. 
 111  See Elena Craft, 12-Step Program for TCEQ to Clean Up Air Pollutant “Hotspots” in 
Texas, TEXAS CLEAN AIR MATTERS, (Apr. 22, 2010), http://blogs.edf.org/texascleanairmatters 
/2010/04/22/12-step-program-for-tceq-to-clean-up-air-pollutant-hotspots-in-texas/ (discussing 
increasing the number of air monitor sites in hotspot areas as part of numerous steps to 
mitigate pollutant concentrations). 
 112  Carlson, supra note 108, at 8. As Carlson’s article explains, EPA is in a difficult position: 
Choosing between more accurate measurements of air quality locations throughout the airshed 
versus using current locations to true measure the overall ambient pollutant levels. Both 
approaches are problematic. The current framing masks hotspots. But it doesn’t make sense to 
consider an entire airshed out of compliance because of a small number of hotspots, either. Id. 
 113 Physicians for Soc. Responsibility v. EPA, No. 12-70079 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2012) (“A 
coalition of environmental groups is currently suing EPA over its failure to mandate near road 
monitors in southern California to establish ambient limits.”). See Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 
4, Physicians for Soc. Responsibility v. EPA, No. 12-70016 (9th Cir. May 18, 2012); Brief for 
Respondent United States Environmental Protection Agency at 1–3, ; Approval of Air Quality 
Implementation Plans; California; South Coast; Attainment Plan for 1997 PM2.5 Standards, 76 
Fed. Reg. 69,928, 69,928, 69,946 (Nov. 9, 2011) (quoting Carlson, supra note 108, at 8 n. 17). 
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But why just cars? As technology improves, we could have small 
backpack sensors or even cell phone apps coupled with phone-mounted 
microsensors that monitor local air quality. This would provide data on our 
daily lives as we actually move. We would not have data from presupposed 
monitoring stations but rather from the places that people actually 
encounter in their daily lives. Now, we don’t have to presuppose where 
pollution happens. The boundaries are defined in real data from the time and 
place people are really living. It may turn out that the worst hotspots are 
actually indoors, beyond the reach of the Clean Air Act,114 or in places we 
never considered. The presupposed line between the clean indoors and the 
dirty outdoors—the presupposed line between EPA and Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration—may become blurred when presupposed 
reference frames are dissolved through emerging technologies. 
Imagine, for example, what nuisance would look like if you could trace 
discrete pollutants that an individual had inhaled or ingested to their original 
sources and you knew the individual’s specific susceptibilities. This would 
describe a classic Lagrangian system but might also describe a sort of 
“frictionless common law.” The challenges of causation would disappear. 
There would still be obstacles, of course, in establishing whether the 
conduct was reasonable and whether the interference was substantial, but 
one of the main barriers to common law actions in the pollution context 
would be removed. 
And there is one further, big Lagrangian legal pivot worth considering. 
What if we had not only personal, mobile air quality data but we also knew 
the genetic susceptibility of the person with the sensors? This is a truly 
Lagrangian system, tracking both individual pollutants and the 
characteristics and responses of the receptors. Let’s assume, for example, 
that people know they are genetically more susceptible to lung cancer from 
fine particulates and their sensors tell them they are entering a high 
particulate area. Does this rise to the level of moving to the nuisance? 
Does this have implications for EPA regulation? A Lagrangian frame of 
reference suggests that the most efficient means to protect people from the 
environmental harms of modern society may be to change the behavior of 
both polluting sources and receptors. One can then well ask whether we 
should be regulating the polluters for the 99.5% sensitive population when 
we can demonstrate that none of that 0.5% live in the target area or could 
easily avoid it. Put simply, could EPA become not a regulator of sources, but 
a regulator of individual movement? Through this vantage, environmental 
law demands more explicit sociological and ethical considerations than the 
more traditional scientific and economic vantages.115 
 
 114  CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION & U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HEALTHY HOUSING REFERENCE MANUAL 5-1 (2006), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/publications/books/housing/housing_ref_manual_2012.pdf. 
 115  For a discussion of how monitoring personal information raises privacy issues, see 
generally Katrina Kuh, Personal Environmental Information: The Promise and Perils of the 
Emerging Capacity to Identify Individual Environmental Harms, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1565 (2012). 
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The implication of this thought experiment is that changing technology 
can facilitate changing reference frames, and in so doing, change basic 
notions of duty and causation. Given recent developments, this could soon 
be a very real scenario. It is too early to know if, as C.J. feared,116 such 
developments will turn our legal worlds upside down. But at a minimum it 








































 116  The West Wing, supra note 6.  
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